Besley, Timothy and Prat, Andrea (2003) Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Discussion paper: UBS Pensions Series 012, 454. Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of residual claims and control rights in private pensions. The residual claimant is the plan sponsor in a defined benefit (DB) plan and the pool of beneficiaries in a defined contribution (DC) plan. The main control rights we examine relate to decisions on funding, asset allocation, and asset management. Under complete contracting, governance can be shown to be neutral: DC and DB plans di.er only on risk allocation. If instead contracts are incomplete, a DB (DC) plan should: (1) Assign more vigilance responsibility to the sponsor (beneficiaries); (2) Rely less (more) on trustees; (3) Tend to employ trustees that are professional experts (caring insiders); (4) Assign asset allocation rights tothe sponsor (beneficiaries); (5) have strict funding requirements.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://fmg.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2003 The Authors |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Sets: | Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG) Collections > Economists Online Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Aug 2009 10:33 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Feb 2014 15:35 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/24853 |
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