Mariano, Beatriz (2008) Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings? Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (613). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
|
PDF
- Published Version
Download (803kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper examines to what extent reputational concerns give rating agencies incentives to reveal information. It demonstrates that, in a simple model in which a rating agency has public and private information about a project, it may ignore private information and even contradict public information in an attempt to minimize reputational costs. A monopolistic agency can act conservatively by issuing too many bad ratings when a project is expected to be good based on private and public information. In a competitive setting, an agency becomes bolder and can issue too many good ratings when a project is expected to be bad based on private and public information. The paper provides a reason for why competition in the ratings industry might lead to overly optimistic ratings even in the absence of conflicts of interest.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.fmg.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2008 The Author |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2009 11:11 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 20:08 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/24433 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics