Qualified majority voting explained

Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé (2004) Qualified majority voting explained. Homo Oeconomicus, 21 (3/4). pp. 573-595. ISSN 0943-0180

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Abstract

We explain the issue of the decision rule of the EU's Council of Ministers. We outline, in as non-technical fashion as we can, the mathematical theory (due to L S Penrose) that addresses this sort of issue. We assess the decision rule prescribed in the Nice Treaty as well as that included in the Draft Constitution proposed by the European Convention. Finally, we propose our own solution to this problem.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.homooeconomicus.org/
Additional Information:	© 2004 Accedo Verlag
Divisions:	CPNSS
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) Q Science > QA Mathematics J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics > C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Date Deposited:	23 Jun 2009 11:57
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 21:49
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/24230

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