Voorhoeve, Alex (2007) Heuristics and biases in a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of "better than". LSE Choice Group working paper series, vol. 3, no. 2. The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London, UK.
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Abstract
Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of the relationship “all things considered better than”. This example invokes our intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of varying intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of rationality. I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people evaluate episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels’ and Temkin’s example does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/Home.aspx |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 Alex Voorhoeve |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Sets: | Research centres and groups > LSE Choice Group Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| Identification Number: | vol. 3, no. 2 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23861/ |
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