Heuristics and biases in a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of "better than"

Voorhoeve, Alex ORCID: 0000-0003-3240-3835 (2007) Heuristics and biases in a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of "better than". LSE Choice Group working paper series (vol. 3, no. 2). The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London, UK.

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Abstract

Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counterexample to the acyclicity of the relationship “all things considered better than”. This example invokes our intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person’s painful experiences of varying intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of rationality. I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people evaluate episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels’ and Temkin’s example does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/Home.aspx
Additional Information:	© 2007 Alex Voorhoeve
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	01 May 2009 14:03
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:49
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/23861

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