Marinkovic, Srdjan T. (2005) Designing an incentive-compatible safety net in a financial system in transition: the case of Serbia. Discussion papers (South East Europe series), DP35. Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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This paper looks at banking as a regulated industry. Inequality of information among various participants is assumed as well as the existence of different incentives. The paper argues that regulation in general and a safety net in particular are necessary to make the financial service industry operate in a safe and appropriate way. From this vantage point, transition banking and, more closely, peculiarities of the Serbian system are analysed. Some guidelines for redesigning the existing safety net in Serbian banking are proposed.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2005 Srdjan T. Marinkovic|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
D History General and Old World > DR Balkan Peninsula
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > LSE Global Governance
Collections > Economists Online
|Date Deposited:||31 Mar 2009 08:43|
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