Cook, Philip (2008) An augmented buck-passing account of the reasons and value: Scanlon and Crisp on what stops the buck. Utilitas, 20 (4). pp. 490-508. ISSN 0953-8208
Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal properties, and that Scanlon is ambiguous about whether the formal property of a reason can stop the buck. Drawing from Wallace, I respond to Crisp's reasons and the good objection by developing an augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value, where the buck is passed consistently from the formal properties of both to the substantive properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes. I end by describing two unresolved problems for buck-passers.
|Additional Information:||© 2008 Cambridge University Press|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Sets:||Departments > Government|
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