von Stengel, Bernhard and Forges, Francoise (2008) Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33 (4). pp. 1002-1022. ISSN 0364-765X
This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by a polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P is not equal to NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.
|Additional Information:||© 2008 INFORMS|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Sets:||Departments > Mathematics|
|Date Deposited:||18 Feb 2009 11:28|
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