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Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity

von Stengel, Bernhard and Forges, Francoise (2008) Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33 (4). pp. 1002-1022. ISSN 0364-765X

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Abstract

This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by a polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P is not equal to NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2008 INFORMS
Library of Congress subject classification: Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 18 Feb 2009 11:28
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22840/

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