Volckart, Oliver (2003) Bureau competition and economic policies in Nazi Germany, 1933-39. Economic History Working Papers, 80/03. Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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This article examines the hypothesis that in the “Third Reich”, bureaucratic agencies engaged in economic policies competed with each other. First, a model of competition is constructed whose predictions are then compared with actual political processes in Nazi Germany. This shows that the bureaus indeed competed with each other, supplying Hitler with political support in exchange for politically relevant property rights. However, in contrast to what the model predicts, they did not adapt their policy supply to the dictator’s wishes. In order to explain this outcome, the paper examines how Hitler protected himself against competitors to himself and how his choice of strategy affected bureau competition.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2003 The Author|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D204 Modern History
D History General and Old World > DD Germany
D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D731 World War II
|Sets:||Departments > Economic History
Collections > Economists Online
|Date Deposited:||05 Feb 2009 09:10|
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