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Captured by the government: ethnic divisions and political accountability

Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2004) Captured by the government: ethnic divisions and political accountability. In: Workshop in Political Economy, 2004-09-14, RI., United States. (Submitted)

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I present a model in which weak institutions in the form of "Personal Rule" regimes compound the problem of ethnic divisions into one of bad governance because of reduced accountability of the leadership. As a consequence, the ruler can construct a kleptocratic regime in which he can steal from the citizens, included his own ethnic supporters, even though he is at the helm of a weak state. The model also predicts extensive use of patronage, and absence of investment in infrastructure. Hence, it fits the experience of bad governance, wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post-colonial Africa.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2004 Gerard Padro i Miquel
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited: 22 Aug 2008 11:40
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2023 08:20

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