Padro i Miquel, Gerard (2007) Strategic risk, civil war and intervention. In: Political Economy Workshop, 12 Feb 2007, Princeton, NJ., USA. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of con°ict in which violence occurs as a result of strategic risk. Actors face a di±cult balancing act between the fear of being attacked and the opportunity cost of breaking peace that selects the risk dominant equilibrium. We link the propensity of con°ict to current and future economic conditions and dis- cuss the e®ects of growth, inequality and military technology on the ability of groups to escape the Security Dilemma.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.princeton.edu/~pegrad/pewsked06.html |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 the author |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Conflict, Security Dilemma, Coordination failure, Global Games, Exit Games |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform |
| Sets: | Collections > Economists Online Departments > Economics |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21145/ |
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Strategic risk, civil war and intervention. (deposited 07 Aug 2008 08:58)
- Strategic risk, civil war and intervention. (deposited 22 Aug 2008 11:07) [Currently Displayed]
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