Padro i Miquel, Gerard (2007) Strategic risk, civil war and intervention. In: Political Economy Workshop, 12 Feb 2007, Princeton, NJ., USA. (Unpublished)
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This paper presents a theory of con°ict in which violence occurs as a result of strategic risk. Actors face a di±cult balancing act between the fear of being attacked and the opportunity cost of breaking peace that selects the risk dominant equilibrium. We link the propensity of con°ict to current and future economic conditions and dis- cuss the e®ects of growth, inequality and military technology on the ability of groups to escape the Security Dilemma.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2007 the author|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Conflict, Security Dilemma, Coordination failure, Global Games, Exit Games|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform|
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
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Strategic risk, civil war and intervention. (deposited 07 Aug 2008 08:58)
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