Padro i Miquel, Gerard (2007) Strategic risk, civil war and intervention. In: Political Economy Workshop, 2007-02-12, NJ., United States. (Submitted)
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper presents a theory of con°ict in which violence occurs as a result of strategic risk. Actors face a di±cult balancing act between the fear of being attacked and the opportunity cost of breaking peace that selects the risk dominant equilibrium. We link the propensity of con°ict to current and future economic conditions and dis- cuss the e®ects of growth, inequality and military technology on the ability of groups to escape the Security Dilemma.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.princeton.edu/~pegrad/pewsked06.html |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 the author |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Aug 2008 11:07 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 08:23 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/21145 |
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