Pre-strike ballots and wage-employment bargaining

Manning, Alan ORCID: 0000-0002-7884-3580 (1991) Pre-strike ballots and wage-employment bargaining. CEPDP (19). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper attempts to construct a model of the economic effects of the introduction of pre-strike ballots in Britain in the Employment Act (1984). It argues that strike ballots tend to reduce union influence over issues which affect different workers in different ways (like plant closures) and will do little to alter union influence over issues which affect workers similarly (like wages). The effect is that compulsory ballots may reduce employment and do little to reduce wages. The robustness of this result is explored in a number of models. An alternative legal framework is also suggested.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 1991 Alan Manning
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Date Deposited:	21 Aug 2008 16:43
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 03:15
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/21126

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