Moral hazard and limited liability in the market for loans : credit restriction versus credit rationing

Banerjee, Anindya and Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 (1988) Moral hazard and limited liability in the market for loans : credit restriction versus credit rationing. CEPR discussion paper ; no. 261. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London.

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Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP261.asp
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	27 Apr 2007
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 04:50
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/2108

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