Dalmazzo, Alberto (1991) Firms' debt and finite-horizon wage bargaining. CEP discussion paper (54). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The simple bargaining mode presented here analyses the effect of a predetermined level of debt repayment commitments on the wage bargaining process between a firm and its workforce. Even if the bargaining process between a firm and its workforce. Even if the bargaining structure is basically derived from Rubinstein (1982), the presence of debt''s interests maturing over time is shown to imply finiteness in the bargaining horizon. The main consequence is that, in contrast with Rubinstein (1982), the parties'' outside options always enter the perfect equilibrium payoffs, justifying their presence in the econometric specifications.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 1991 Alberto Dalmazzo |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Aug 2008 11:22 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:32 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/21075 |
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