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Dispute deterrence: evidence on final-offer arbitration

Milner, S. (1992) Dispute deterrence: evidence on final-offer arbitration. CEP discussion paper (76). Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Final-offer arbitration is specifically designed to deter disputes more efficiently than conventional arbitration. Over the last decade a number of UK workplaces have signed new collective agreements incorporating this form of arbitration. Evidence from 72 of these plants, covering nearly 300 bargaining rounds, is used to test the theory. The data suggest that, except in multistage dispute procedures, FAO is not more effective than conventional arbitration at preventing disputes in collective bargaining.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 1992 S.Milner
Divisions: Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Date Deposited: 21 Aug 2008 09:09
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2021 11:43

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