Besley, Timothy and Coate, Stephen (1997) Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy. Theoretical Economics; TE/1997/334, TE/1997/334. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes, because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences. On the normative side, coordination failure among lobbyists can result in Pareto inefficient policy choices. In addition, by creating rents to holding office, lobbying can lead to 'excessive' entry into electoral competition.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1997 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory
H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
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