Rosen, A. (1992) An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination. CEPDP, 97. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 1992 A.Rosen |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Sets: | Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| Identification Number: | 97 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21024/ |
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