Rosen, A. (1992) An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination. CEPDP, 97. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1992 A.Rosen|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor|
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
|Date Deposited:||20 Aug 2008 13:40|
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