Rosen, A. (1992) An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination. CEPDP (97). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work.
Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
Additional Information: | © 1992 A.Rosen |
Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
Date Deposited: | 20 Aug 2008 13:40 |
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:33 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/21024 |
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