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Evidence of efficiency wage payments in UK firm level panel data

Konings, J. and Walsh, Patrick Paul (1993) Evidence of efficiency wage payments in UK firm level panel data. CEP discussion paper, 138. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

Efficiency wage theories have been put forward as attractive ways of explaining different aspects of the labour market. To find direct evidence of efficiency wage payments has proven to be quite difficult. We model various vertical spillovers from wage determination in an upstream labour market to market share performance in a downstream product market and vice versa. We do this within Sutton''s (1991) general oligopoly model under alternative theories of the labour market. Rent sharing due to efficiency wages is shown to create only a downstream vertical spillover. While rent sharing due to wage bargaining creates a two way vertical spillover. The spillovers due to efficiency wage payments are shown to be the only downstream spillover that drives a positive relationship between a firm''s wage growth and product market performance. Using U.K. firm level panel data we constrain the data with our theory to pinpoint the downstream spillover due to efficiency wage payments. The spillover turns out to be significant and we claim this to be the first direct and general empirical evidence for efficiency wage payments.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 1993 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Identification Number: 138
Date Deposited: 19 Aug 2008 15:30
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20977/

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