Haller, H. and Ioannides, Y. (1995) Strategic games modles of economic integration. CEPDP (208). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We set up two country games to express strategic aspects of economic integration, where integration requires overcoming fixed costs in the form of a vector of resources, the two countries'' agents'' characteristics are diverse, and each country''s contribution is subject to strategic choice. Individual agents'' payoff depend, for any given trade allocation rule, on how integration costs are shared. We show existence of equilibrium and explore the properties of the game. A number of examples demonstrate that autarky or a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, some of which are Pareto rankable, are possible outcomes. We also explore certain strategic aspects of economic integration of the three country case.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 1995 the authors |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Aug 2008 14:23 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:21 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20755 |
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