Neary, J. Peter and O'Sullivan, Paul (1998) Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. CEPDP, 408. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. ISBN 075301243X
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Abstract
This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other''s R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 1998 the authors |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HF Commerce |
| Sets: | Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| Identification Number: | 408 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20247/ |
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