Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets

Neary, J. Peter and O'Sullivan, Paul (1998) Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. CEPDP (408). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK. ISBN 075301243X

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (86kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other''s R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 1998 the authors
Divisions: Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2008 11:59
Last Modified: 13 Sep 2024 19:39
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20247

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics