Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets

Neary, J. Peter and O'Sullivan, Paul (1998) Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. CEPDP (408). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK. ISBN 075301243X

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Abstract

This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other''s R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 1998 the authors
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Date Deposited:	31 Jul 2008 11:59
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 19:39
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20247

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