Neary, J. Peter and Leahy, Dermot (1998) Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies. CEPDP, 409. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (133Kb) | Preview
In this paper characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole''s "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and extensions to second-best, revenue-constrained and entry-promotion policies.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1998 the authors|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Learning by Doing; R&D Subsidies; Strategic Trade Policy; Export Subsidies; Commitment; Dynamic Consistency|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
|Date Deposited:||31 Jul 2008 11:45|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|