Quah, Danny (2002) 24/7 competitive innovation. CEP working paper, 1218. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
Intellectual property (IP) rights differ from ordinary property rights. Historically, societies have tolerated monopolistic inefficiency from IP protection to incentivize intellectual asset creation. This paper considers how competitive markets can optimally allocate resources, bypassing that monopolistic inefficiency. It departs from earlier related work in three ways: First, it allows economic actions undertaken progressively rapidly as technology advances. Second, it weakens property rights yet further, allowing both consumers and asset holders to make and sell copies. Third, it distinguishes nonrivalry from infinite reproduction. The first departure restores the traditional view that competitive markets fail. The second and third, surprisingly, have competitive markets achieve social efficiency.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2002 London School of Economics and Political Science|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law (General)
T Technology > T Technology (General)
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues|
|Sets:||Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > LSE IDEAS
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for the Study of Human Rights
|Funders:||Economic and Social Research Council|
|Date Deposited:||27 Apr 2007|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|