Quah, Danny (2002) 24/7 competitive innovation. CEP working paper (1218). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Intellectual property (IP) rights differ from ordinary property rights. Historically, societies have tolerated monopolistic inefficiency from IP protection to incentivize intellectual asset creation. This paper considers how competitive markets can optimally allocate resources, bypassing that monopolistic inefficiency. It departs from earlier related work in three ways: First, it allows economic actions undertaken progressively rapidly as technology advances. Second, it weakens property rights yet further, allowing both consumers and asset holders to make and sell copies. Third, it distinguishes nonrivalry from infinite reproduction. The first departure restores the traditional view that competitive markets fail. The second and third, surprisingly, have competitive markets achieve social efficiency.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2002 London School of Economics and Political Science |
| Divisions: | Economics IGA: LSE IDEAS LSE Human Rights |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory K Law > K Law (General) T Technology > T Technology (General) |
| JEL classification: | O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Apr 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:31 |
| Funders: | Economic and Social Research Council |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/2021 |
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