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Majority voting on restricted domains

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2007) Majority voting on restricted domains. Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition gen- eralizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results provide new support for the robustness of majority rule.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/default.htm
Additional Information: © 2007 Franz Dietrich and Christian List
Library of Congress subject classification: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Sets: Departments > Government
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 29 Jul 2008 14:28
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20114/

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