When to defer to supermajority testimony – and when not

List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2006) When to defer to supermajority testimony – and when not. . Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. (Submitted)

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Abstract

Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. Here I identify the conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and those under which it does not. I also introduce the new concept of ‘consistency of degree k’, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only ‘blatant’ inconsistencies in an agent’s beliefs while permitting less blatant ones, and show that, while supermajoritarian deference often fails to ensure full consistency, it is a route to consistency in this weaker sense.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/default.htm
Additional Information:	© 2006 Christian List
Divisions:	Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	29 Jul 2008 09:19
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 19:59
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20074

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