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Incentives in competitive search equilibrium

Moen, Espen R. and Rosen, Asa (2007) Incentives in competitive search equilibrium. CEPDP, 832. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. ISBN 9780853282075

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Identification Number: 832

Abstract

This paper analyses the interaction between internal agency problems within firms and external search frictions when workers have private information. We show that the allocation of resources is determined by a modified Hosios Rule. We then analyze the effect of changes in the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. We find that private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in productivity. The incentive power of the wage contracts is positively related to high productivity, low unemployment benefits and high search frictions.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2007 the authors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2008 14:09
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 09:12
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19663

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