Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Martimort, David (1998) A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. TE (356). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor residual claimant for the hierarchy's profit. Under risk-aversion, the optimal contract trades-off the supervisor's incentives to reveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous transaction costs. Now, transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisory technology and the supervisor's degree of risk-aversion. We then discuss various implications of the model for the design and management of organisations.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 1998 the authors |
| Divisions: | STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Jul 2008 10:26 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:39 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19356 |
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