Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2005) Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation. PEPP (13). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op- posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2005 the authors
Divisions:	Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Date Deposited:	11 Jul 2008 09:15
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:40
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19295

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