Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Moral hazard, limited liability and taxation : a principal agent model

Banerjee, Anindya and Besley, Timothy (1991) Moral hazard, limited liability and taxation : a principal agent model. In: Sinclair, Peter J N and Slater, Martin D E, (eds.) Taxation, Private Information and Capital. UNSPECIFIED, pp. 46-60. ISBN 0-19-828729-1

Full text not available from this repository.

Item Type: Book Section
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 27 Apr 2007
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/1927/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only