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Indicative conditionals

Bradley, Richard (2002) Indicative conditionals. Erkenntnis, 56 (3). pp. 345-378. ISSN 0165-0106

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Identification Number: 10.1023/A:1016331903927

Abstract

Adams’ Thesis has much evidence in its favour, but DavidLewis famously showed that it cannot be true, in all but the most trivial of cases, if conditionals are proprositions and their probabilities are classical probabilities of truth. In this paper I show thatsimilar results can be constructed for a much wider class of conditionals. The fact that these results presupposethat the logic of conditionals is Boolean motivates a search for a non-Boolean alternative. It is arguedthat the exact proposition expressed by a conditional depends on the context in which it is uttered. Consequentlyits probability of truth will depend not only on the probabilities of the various propositions it mightexpress, but also on the probabilities of the contexts determining which proposition it does in fact express.The semantic theory developed from this is then shown to explain why agents’ degrees of belief satisfyAdams’ Thesis. Finally the theory is compared with proposals for a three-valued logic of conditionals.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/0165-0106
Additional Information: © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers
Divisions: CPNSS
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Sets: Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2008 09:17
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2020 02:51
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/18246

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