Kanazawa, Satoshi (2000) A new solution to the collective action problem: the paradox of voter turnout. American sociological review, 65 (3). pp. 433-442. ISSN 0003-1224
Macy's work offers a potential solution to the paradox of voter turnout. The stochastic learning theory of voter turnout (Kanazawa 1998) posits that citizens perceive a correlation between their behavior (voting versus abstention) and the outcome of collective action (win versus loss for their candidate), and that they interpret the outcome as a reinforcer or a punisher. The theory can solve the paradox of voter turnout because now p, the probability that one's vote is or appears decisive, equals approximately .500 in the calculus-of-voting model (instead of p 0). I use General Social Survey data to test the theory. The empirical results indicate that citizens make their turnout decisions according to the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" pattern predicted by the stochastic learning theory, especially if there are no strong third-party candidates.
|Additional Information:||© 2000 American Sociological Association|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)|
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Departments > Management
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|