Kanazawa, Satoshi 
ORCID: 0000-0003-3786-8797
(2000)
A new solution to the collective action problem: the paradox of voter turnout.
American Sociological Review, 65 (3).
pp. 433-442.
ISSN 0003-1224
Abstract
Macy's work offers a potential solution to the paradox of voter turnout. The stochastic learning theory of voter turnout (Kanazawa 1998) posits that citizens perceive a correlation between their behavior (voting versus abstention) and the outcome of collective action (win versus loss for their candidate), and that they interpret the outcome as a reinforcer or a punisher. The theory can solve the paradox of voter turnout because now p, the probability that one's vote is or appears decisive, equals approximately .500 in the calculus-of-voting model (instead of p 0). I use General Social Survey data to test the theory. The empirical results indicate that citizens make their turnout decisions according to the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" pattern predicted by the stochastic learning theory, especially if there are no strong third-party candidates.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.asanet.org/cs/root/leftnav/publications... |
| Additional Information: | © 2000 American Sociological Association |
| Divisions: | Management |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Dec 2008 12:01 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Nov 2024 03:12 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/17764 |
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