Schelkle, Waltraud 
ORCID: 0000-0003-4127-107X
(2005)
The political economy of fiscal policy coordination in EMU: from disciplinarian device to insurance arrangement.
Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (2).
pp. 371-391.
ISSN 0021-9886
Abstract
The fiscal policy framework of EMU and possible reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact have elicited much debate. The pact has been predicated on a conception of it as a device to discipline Member States. This gives rise to a paradox in which the credibility of policy-makers it is supposed to enhance is undermined. The article puts forward an alternative conception of policy co-ordination — collective insurance — designed to enhance the effectiveness of fiscal stabilization. The two approaches lead to different interpretations of how domestic interests affect policy-making. The insurance approach is shown to support various reform proposals by the Commission.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/JCMS |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
| Divisions: | European Institute |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Sep 2008 14:29 |
| Last Modified: | 31 Jan 2025 04:15 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/16567 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
