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Thy neighbor''s keeper: the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test

Banerjee, Abhijit, Besley, Timothy and Guinnane, Timothy W (1994) Thy neighbor''s keeper: the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (2). pp. 491-515. ISSN 0033-5533

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Identification Number: 10.2307/2118471


Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by nonfirm economic institutions. However, our theories of nonfirm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy. This paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from German credit cooperatives from nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. We build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 1994 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Sets: Departments > Economics
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 27 Apr 2007
Last Modified: 17 Feb 2021 11:05

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