Thy neighbor''s keeper: the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test

Banerjee, Abhijit, Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Guinnane, Timothy W (1994) Thy neighbor''s keeper: the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (2). pp. 491-515. ISSN 0033-5533

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Abstract

Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by nonfirm economic institutions. However, our theories of nonfirm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy. This paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from German credit cooperatives from nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. We build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
Additional Information:	© 1994 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Date Deposited:	27 Apr 2007
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2024 05:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/1626

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