de Meza, David and Lockwood, Ben (2004) Spillovers, investment incentives and the property rights theory of the firm. Journal of industrial economics, 52 (2). pp. 229-253. ISSN 0022-1821
This paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager's relationship-specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down. The investments of non owners may then be devalued, but are seldom wholly lost to the owner. With such spillovers, the outside-option principle can be incorporated into the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates. Enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge.
|Additional Information:||© 2004 Blackwell Publishing|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Sets:||Departments > Management|
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