Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David (2001) An asset theory of social preferences. American political science review, 95 (4). pp. 875-893. ISSN 0003-0554
We present a theory of social policy preferences that emphasizes the composition of peopleÕs skills. The key to our argument is that individuals who have made risky investments in skills will demand insurance against the possible future loss of income from those investments. Because the transferability of skills is inversely related to their specificity, workers with specific skills face a potentially long spell of unemployment or a significant decline in income in the event of job loss. Workers deriving most of their income from specific skills therefore have strong incentives to support social policies that protect them against such uncertainty. This is not the case for general skills workers, for whom the costs of social protection weigh more prominently. We test the theory on public opinion data for eleven advanced democracies and suggest how differences in educational systems can help explain cross-national differences in the level of social protection.
|Additional Information:||© 2001 Cambridge University Press|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Sets:||Departments > European Institute|
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