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The core executive's approach to regulation: from 'better regulation' to 'risk-tolerant deregulation'

Dodds, Anneliese (2006) The core executive's approach to regulation: from 'better regulation' to 'risk-tolerant deregulation'. Social Policy and Administration, 40 (5). pp. 526-542. ISSN 0144-5596

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Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00503.x


This article examines changes in the New Labour core executive's approach to regulation and its relationship with risk, through analysing documentary, legislative and press sources concerning approaches to regulatory decision-making. It claims that an initial commitment to ‘better regulation’ has gradually been replaced by explicit support for deregulation. A reduction in the scope of regulation was also promoted by the Thatcher and Major governments. The New Labour core executive shares previous (Conservative) administrations’ concern to include business in deregulatory decision-making. However, the article claims that there is one significant difference in the New Labour deregulatory approach: a new toleration of risk. Deregulation is, now, described as a corrective to regulators’ over-reactions to perceived risks, which, it is claimed, are holding back economic and technological progress. However, this new approach excludes competing views concerning how risk should be regulated. In particular, it does not engage with widespread popular views that governments should continue to protect against risk.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 Wiley-Blackwell
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) > JN101 Great Britain
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2008 13:11
Last Modified: 04 Jan 2024 07:12

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