von Stengel, Bernhard and Forges, Francoise (2006) Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity. CDAM research report, LSE-CDAM-2006-04. Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper defines the extensive form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann’s strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P 6= NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Report)|
|Additional Information:||© 2006 the authors|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Correlated equilibrium, extensive game, polynomial-time computable|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Sets:||Departments > Mathematics|
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