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Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity

von Stengel, Bernhard and Forges, Francoise (2006) Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity. CDAM research report, LSE-CDAM-2006-04. Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Identification Number: LSE-CDAM-2006-04


This paper defines the extensive form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann’s strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Assuming P 6= NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.

Item Type: Monograph (Report)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 the authors
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2008 15:30
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 09:05

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