Besley, Timothy and Case, Anne (1995) Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices: evidence from gubernatorial term limits. Quarterly journal of economics, 110 (3). pp. 769-798. ISSN 0033-5533
Abstract
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1995 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Sets: | Departments > Economics Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/1360/ |
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