Forges, Francoise and von Stengel, Bernhard (2002) Computationally efficient coordination in game trees. CDAM research report series, LSE-CDAM-2002-02. Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
The solution concept of “correlated equilibrium” allows for coordination in games. For game trees with imperfect information, it gives rise to NP-hard problems, even for two-player games without chance moves. We introduce the “extensive form correlated equilibrium” (EFCE), which extends Aumann’s correlated equilibrium, where coordination is achieved by signals that are received “locally” at information sets. An EFCE is polynomial-time computable for two-player games without chance moves.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Report)|
|Additional Information:||© 2002 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Sets:||Departments > Mathematics
Research centres and groups > Computational, Discrete and Applicable Mathematics@LSE (CDAM)
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|