A nuclear veto? The credibility-consensus trade-off and NATO nuclear use procedures

Majnemer, Jacklyn ORCID: 0000-0002-8937-250X (2025) A nuclear veto? The credibility-consensus trade-off and NATO nuclear use procedures. Texas National Security Review. ISSN 2576-1021

Text (TNSR-Vol-8-Issue-4-Book_Roundtable) - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial. Download (1MB)

Abstract

This roundtable examines sources of change in the rapidly evolving global nuclear order. Quantitative expansion combines with qualitative doctrinal changes to challenge traditional deterrence frameworks. Emerging security arrangements such as AUKUS, the Washington Declaration, and expanded NATO–Indo-Pacific ties illustrate evolving alliance strategies, while adversarial cooperation among Russia, China, and North Korea heightens risks of coordinated nuclear coercion. Across democratic and authoritarian systems alike, domestic politics increasingly influence nuclear decision-making, shaping perceptions of credibility, creating proliferation pressures, and dampening arms control prospects. Essays in this collection analyze six regional loci—Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, China, and the Korean Peninsula—highlighting two themes: the centrality of domestic political drivers and the cascading effects of nuclear dynamics across interconnected states and regions. Together, this analysis offers a two-level framework for understanding and addressing the complex challenges confronting today’s nuclear order.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	J Political Science > JZ International relations
Date Deposited:	14 Oct 2025 00:19
Last Modified:	23 Oct 2025 08:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/129791

Actions (login required)

View Item