A model of common law adjudication

Panjwani, Raja (2025) A model of common law adjudication. Theory and Decision. ISSN 0040-5833

Text (s11238-025-10078-4) - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (1MB)

Abstract

Interpreting judicial decision-making in terms of a realistic optimization problem has been a longstanding challenge for economic theories of adjudication. This article develops a theory of value for a fundamental decision facing an appellate court: the choice of whether to follow, distinguish, or overrule precedent. Extending the framework of reason-based choice into a dynamic model of jurisprudence, the theory illustrates distinctive judicial phenomena such as the practice of ‘stealth overruling’, and also sheds new light on judicial minimalism, legal completeness, and the constraint of precedent.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	26 Aug 2025 14:39
Last Modified:	06 Oct 2025 15:39
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/129281

Actions (login required)

View Item