Do people better recognize inconsistencies in others’ moral judgments than their own? If so, why?

Luptakova, Veronika, Galizzi, Matteo M. ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625, Krpan, Dario ORCID: 0000-0002-3420-4672 and Voorhoeve, Alex ORCID: 0000-0003-3240-3835 (2025) Do people better recognize inconsistencies in others’ moral judgments than their own? If so, why? Philosophical Psychology. ISSN 0951-5089 (In Press)

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Abstract

This paper explores whether people are more likely to recognize inconsistency in others’ judgments than in their own, and if so, why. It reports two pre-registered online experiments with samples representative of the UK population (N = 814 and N = 1,623). In Study 1, people are more likely to recognize inconsistency in others’ moral (and non-moral) judgments than in their own. Study 2 replicates this finding and tests three explanations: (i) motivated reasoning, (ii) selective cognitive effort, and (iii) limited insight into others’ reasoning. Ad (i), because people’s susceptibility to motivated reasoning is said to diminish when people must account for their judgments, the presence of motivated reasoning was examined by manipulating social accountability. No effect was found. Ad (ii), while people spent significantly more time (a proxy for cognitive effort) on reviewing others’ consistency than their own, this explained only a fraction of the greater rate at which inconsistencies in others’ reasoning were recognized. Ad (iii), using low confidence in consistency evaluations as a proxy for limited insight, the study did not find support for the limited insight hypothesis. The finding that people are better at recognizing inconsistency in others’ moral judgments aligns with the idea that moral consistency reasoning is a social device that operates best when we interact with others, but more research is needed to uncover the psychological mechanisms behind this effect.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Psychological and Behavioural Science Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Date Deposited:	22 Aug 2025 14:36
Last Modified:	22 Aug 2025 15:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/129258

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