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Breaking up and the value of commitment

Healey, Richard ORCID: 0000-0001-5568-2086 (2023) Breaking up and the value of commitment. Ergo, 10. pp. 158-187. ISSN 2330-4014

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Identification Number: 10.3998/ergo.4636

Abstract

While love and personal relationships are the subjects of rich and sophisticated literatures, philosophical writing about the end of special relationships is much harder to come by. However, the end of special relationships is a significant part of our lives and gives rise to a number of philosophical questions. In this article, I explore the normative significance of the end of special relationships, with a particular focus on the case of breaking up in the context of committed romantic relationships. Specifically, I address three questions. First, what does A do when A breaks up with B? Second, what normative effect will A’s breaking up with B have on the relationship-based duties, reasons, and permissions that are partly constitutive of A and B’s relationship? Third, how is the ability to break up consistent with the commitment that many longer-term romantic relationships involve? In response to the first and second questions, I argue that breaking up is a neglected example of a normative power and develop a tripartite account of the normative effects of exercising this power. In response to the third question, I develop an account of the nature and value of commitment within romantic relationships and show how the power to exit a relationship by breaking up is consistent with this form of commitment.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2023 The Author
Divisions: CPNSS
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
H Social Sciences
Date Deposited: 12 Jun 2025 15:45
Last Modified: 12 Jun 2025 23:31
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/128392

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