Besley, Timothy and Coate, Stephen (1997) An economic model of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1). pp. 85-114. ISSN 0033-5533
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy-making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office. The approach has a number of attractive features. First, it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by, as well as of, the people. Second, the model is analytically tractable, being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally. Third, it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1997 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Apr 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Apr 2024 01:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/1276 |
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