The moral ambiguity of the AI consciousness debate

Wasserziehr, Jan Henrik (2025) The moral ambiguity of the AI consciousness debate. In: Seibt, Johanna, Fazekas, Peter and Quick, Oliver Santiago, (eds.) Proceedings of Robophilosophy. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,397. IOS Press. ISBN 978-1-64368-567-0 (In Press)

Text (Proceedings_Jan H Wasserziehr_Submission57) - Accepted Version Pending embargo until 1 January 2100. Download (304kB)

Abstract

In this paper, I review the recent debate on the prospect of AI consciousness and assess its ethical relevance. Intuitively, when a being is conscious, this is sufficient to ground its non-derivative moral status. However, the semantic content of consciousness is ambiguous, particularly when attributed to non-biotic entities. Standard ethical accounts concerning the moral status of sentient beings presuppose affective or valenced consciousness. Yet, recent speculations about artificial consciousness have largely been driven by considerations of cognitive architecture, often neglecting the affective aspect of subjective experience. Crucially, no persuasive narrative currently exists about how valenced states may emerge in artificial systems. This significantly reduces the ethical relevance of current AI consciousness claims. As ethicists, we are well-advised to treat such claims with care, demanding precision and rigor when consciousness is attributed to artificial systems. This involves developing logically coherent claims about the emergence of artificial valence.

Item Type:	Book Section
Additional Information:	© 2025
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	17 Feb 2025 16:15
Last Modified:	20 Feb 2025 16:09
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/127327

Actions (login required)

View Item