The targeting of economic sanctions

Djankov, Simeon ORCID: 0000-0002-0822-6456 and Su, Meng (2025) The targeting of economic sanctions. Economics Letters, 248. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We use a comprehensive dataset of economic sanctions over the past 30 years to show that US unilateral sanctions are often off the mark, while United Nations sanctions tend to be well-targeted. Sanctions that target democratic stability and conflict resolution are best correlated with their stated goals.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	J Political Science H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K33 - International Law O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
Date Deposited:	11 Feb 2025 10:57
Last Modified:	17 Mar 2025 17:43
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/127240

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